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STUDENT NOTE

Mines and Minerals-Surface Transmission of
Electricity Under Implied Mining Rights
The modem techniques of drift or deep coal mining demand an
abundant supply of electrical power. Safe, economical and efficient
transmission of this power throughout the mining operation has
raised a legal issue between the owner of the coal and the surface
owner. The issue arising is whether the owner of the coal possesses,
as incident to that ownership, the implied right to use the surface
for the erection of utility poles which carry the transmission lines.
The electrical system for each mine is unique and therefore a
rule of thumb comparison of the cost of surface transmission to
that of transmission through the mine entries is not possible.
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Speaking generally, however, it is economically more advantageous
to carry these transmission lines over the surface.' From a tech-

nical viewpoint, surface transmission is more satisfactory and this
includes the ability to use a higher voltage with a reduced amount

of loss. Safety and maintenance features add to the desirability of
surface transmission.'

The coal owner's right to use the surface was established in the
noted case of Squires v. Lafferty' wherein the court stated that the
owner of the coal possesses as incident to that ownership ".

.

. the

right to use the 'surface' of the land in such a manner and with such
means as would be fairly necessary for the enjoyment of the mineral
estate." "This rule is based upon the principle that when a thing is
granted all the means to obtain it and all the fruits and effects of it

are also granted."4 The mere inconvenience of the owner of the servient estate is not sufficient to preclude the exercise of these rights.

"That which is really appropriate, useful and convenient is necessary and proper, notwithstanding something different might be
made to subserve the same purpose."5 Damage caused in the
proper exercise of these rights is damnum absque injuria to the
owner of the surface.6
'As a specific example the electrical engineer employed by one of the
larger mining companies, when considering a particular mine, advanced that
it would cost roughly four to five times as much to run the transmission lines
through the mine rather than over the surface.
I Interviews with Charles T. Holland, Dean of the School of Mines and
Professor of Mining Engineering, West Virginia University, in Morgantown,
W. Va., Oct. 9, 1963; Joseph Dwight McClung, Associate Professor of Mining
Engineering, West Virginia University, in Morgantown, W. Va., Oct. 9, 1963;
Edwin Channing Jones, Professor and Chairman of the Department of
Electrical Engineering, West Virginia University, in Morgantown, W. Va.,
Oct. 14, 1963.
3 95 W. Va. 307, 309, 121 S.E. 90, 91 (1924), citing Porter v. Mack Mfg.
Co., 65 W. Va. 636, 64 S.E. 853 (1909). The West Virginia law appears to
be in a state of some conflict with respect to whether the court or the jury
shall have the duty to finally determine the fairly necessary use of the surface
as guaranteed by the Squires case. That this is a question of law for the
court is advanced in Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Co., 134 W. Va. 719, 724, 61
S.E.2d 633, 636 (1950). No authority is cited in support of this proposition.
Contra, Armstrong v. Maryland Coal Co., 67 W. Va. 589, 608, 69 S.E. 195,
205 (1910), citing 1 BARRINGER & ADAms, MINEs & MINING N THE UNrr=n
STATES 577 (1900); DoNLEY, CoAL, OI. & GAS IN WEST VIRmGIr & VImNA
§ 141a
4 (1951).
Squires v. Lafferty, 95 W. Va. 307, 309, 121 S.E. 90, 91 (1924);
Cole v. Ross Coal Co., 150 F. Supp. 808 (S.D. W. Va.), aff'd, 249 F.2d 600
(4th Cir. 1957); 36 Am. JuR. Mines & Minerals § 177 (1941); DoNLEY, op.
cit. supra note 3; 14 BAYLOR L. REv. 241 (1962).
5 Preston County Coke Co. v. Elkins Coal & Coke Co., 82 W. Va. 590,
596,96
S.E. 973, 975 (1918).
6
Adis v. United Fuel Gas Co., supranote 3, at 725.
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The West Virginia court has said that a road used in hauling
core drilling machinery,' the construction and use of a tramway
in fire-clay mining,8 and the use of approximately one acre of
land in oil and gas production,9 are proper uses of the surface
under implied mining rights. Beyond this, the court has been silent
on the issue of what particular acts constitute the fairly necessary
use of the surface under the doctrine of the Squires case.
Having established that the mineral owner possesses the implied
right to use the surface, the question is presented as to the effect
of an express grant of mining rights when combined with those
raised by implication. The case of West Virginia-PittsburghCoal
Co. v. Strong,'0 indicates that an express grant of mining rights
limits those raised by implication. Professor Donley comments on
that portion of the Strong case by submitting that this is not the
common understanding of the profession nor does the grantee intend to waive these implied rights when accepting a deed containing specifically enumerated rights." Six years after this criticism of the Strong case, it was announced in the case of Cole v.
Ross Coal Co., that ". . . expressed mining rights are in addition
to, and not in substitution for, the implied mining rights which the
law gives an owner of coal. This is not a case for the application
of the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius .... ."2 While the
statement in the Strong case still exists to be argued, the later pronouncement
of the Cole case seems to have the support of more
3
authority.'
The Strong case is cited more often for the rule that the owner
of the mineral estate does not possess, as incident to his ownership,
the right to mine coal by what is commonly termed surface or
strip mining unless mining by such a method was known and
accepted as common practice in the area at the time of the severance.' 4 This view has been followed in the cases of Oresta v.
7

8 Squires v. Lafferty, supra note 4.

Porter v. Mack Mfg. Co., supra note 3; see DoNLEY, op. cit. supra

note 3.

9Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Co., supranote 3; King v. South Penn Oil Co.,
110 W. Va. 107, 157 S.E. 82 (1931).
10 129 W. Va. 832, 836, 42 S.E.2d 46, 49 (1947).
1DoNLE:Y, op. cit. supranote 3, § 144.
12 150 F. Supp. 808, 816 (S.D. W.Va.), aff'd, 249 F.2d 600 (4th Cir.

1957); See also, 58 C.J.S. Mines & Minerals § 150(B) (1948), citing Jilek
v. Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co., 382 Ml1. 241, 47 N.E.2d 96

(1943).
11 See nn. Nos. 11 & 12; 36 Am. JuR., op. cit. supra note 4.
14 Cole v. Ross Coal Co., supra note 4; DoNLEY, op. cit. supra note 3, §§
144, 151.
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Romano Bros.,'5 and United States v. Polino.16 The court followed
the same rule and reached the same result in the case of Brown
v. Crozer Coal & Land Co.,'" where the mining method was the
use of an auger rather than strip mining. The rule established by
these cases has been advanced as the law applicable to the use of
new techniques such as the erection of utility poles for the carriage
of transmission lines. Two distinctions may be drawn to show
that such an application should not be made.
The first turns upon the meaning of the phrase "fairly necessary
use of the surface." This distinction was originally adopted in the
Strong case'" and has been further sanctioned in the cases of Cole
v. Ross Coal Co.,'9 and United States v. Polino," to the end that
the implied right of the coal owner to use so much of the surface
as is fairly necessary does not include the right to destroy the surface as is done in the process of strip mining. "It is beyond all
reason to conclude that the parties to the deed .. .at the time

of the execution of such deed, had in contemplation the possible
complete destruction and removal of the entire surface of said
lands, together with everything growing thereon."2' Logically it
should follow that the erection of utility poles and substations22
which are directly connected with such an operation, involves the
use of the surface and not its destruction and removal and thus
a completely different situation from that raised in the cited cases
appears to be presented.
The second distinction turns upon the phrase "by the usual
method" and has the same origin and history as that of the first. 3
By looking to the circumstances existing at the time of the execution of the severance deed,24 the court has refused to recognize
1516 137
Va. 633,73
S.E.2dW.622
131 W.
F. Supp.
772 (N.D.
Va.(1952).
1955); 58 W. VA. L. REv. 174 (1955);
13 WAsH. &Lm L. REv. 76 (1956).
17 144 W. Va. 296, 107 S.E.2d 777 (1959); 62 W. VA. L. REv. 194
(1959).

('129 W. Va.832, 843, 42 S.E.2d 46, 52 (1947); 58 CJ.S., op. cit. supra
note 12, § 159; 19 WAsH. & LE L.REv.276 (1963).
19 150 F.Supp. 808, 815 (S.D. W.Va.), affd, 249 F.2d 600 (4th Cir.
1957).
20 131 F.Supp.772, 776 (N.D.W. Va.1955).
2 United States v.Polino, 131 F.Supp.772,776 (N.D.W Va.1955).
22
W. VA. CoDE ch. 22, art. 2,§ 39 (Michie 1961); as to the use of the
surface with respect to "structures" ingeneral, see DoNrxy op. cit. supra note
3, § 142.
23 See notes 18, 19 &20 supra; as applied to auger mining see Brown v.
Crozer
2 Coal & Land Co., 144 W. Va. 296, 107 S.E.2d 777 (1959).
AIWhite v.Bailey, 65 W. Va. 573, 64 S.E. 1019 (1909); See generally,
13

WASH. & LEE L.

1Ev. 76 (1956).
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the implication of the right to auger or to strip on the theory that
the right retained is the right to mine coal by the usual method
known and accepted as common practice at the time and in the
area of the severance deed. Divergent mining methods should not
here be confused with advancements of technique within a particular mining method. By deep mine operations, ".... the surface

even when broken or caused to subside, is damaged, rather than
destroyed."25 However, by strip mine operations, ".

.

. the vein

of coal is exposed by the removal of the earth and growth above
26

it."

If subsidence is not destruction, certainly the erection of utility
poles should not be considered destruction. The erection of such
poles does not present the element of subjecting the surface to
possible destruction by the adoption of new and different mining
methods but rather is an advancement of technique within the
method utilized at the time of the severance, i.e. drift or deep
mining. The variance in mining methods causing the appearance
and usefulness of the surface to be so altered, can be understood
as sufficient reason to require the parties to bargain and pay for
the right to auger or to strip unless the same was a known and
accepted practice in the area at the time of the severance.
The "usual method" test has been applied in cases involving the
destruction of the surface by new mining methods such as auger
and strip mining. This test has never been applied in the case
of new techniques within a single mining method. The use of
developments within the art of mining by a particular method should
not fall within the rule applied to those cases wherein different
mining methods exist when the only mining method under consideration is in fact the method employed at the time of the severance.
The mineral owner's use of utility poles and transmission lines
has been the subject of only one decision by the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia."' Professor Donley casts doubt upon
the significance of the holding by stating that,
"neither the terms of the severance deed, nor those of the lease
are reported. .

.

. Apparently, the lessee did not claim such

rights as incident to the ownership of the coal, but contended
25
26

27

United States v. Polino, supra note 21.

Ibid.

Annstrong v. Pinnacle Coal & Coke Co., 101 W, Va. 15, 131 S.E. 712

(1926).
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that the poles were erected on a road. It was held that such
use of a road, without permission from any official body, imposes a new additional burden on the abutting owner. Under
the reported facts, this case cannot be considered as authority
for the proposition that the owner of coal has no right whatsoever to erect power poles as incidental to his ownership."28
A final decision as to whether a mineral owner possesses this right
as incident to his ownership has not been rendered in West Virginia.
The West Virginia court has said that "the owner is not limited
to such appliances as existed at the time of the grant; he may freely
employ the means of invention; he may erect all adequate modem
machinery for mining and draining."29 The Virginia court has
taken the same position in recognizing that the mineral owner
... may keep pace with the progress of society and of modem
invention."'0
Upon the strength of these principles, West Virginia should
support the mineral owner's implied right to erect utility poles by
adjudging such to be fairly necessary to the enjoyment of the mineral estate under the doctrine of the Squires case.'. This end will
be more easily attained if the law applicable to different mining
methods is not allowed to cloud the issue presented. Those few
jurisdictions which have decided the issue take cognizance of the
implied right to erect poles for the support of transmission lines. 2
Charles David McMunn

28

cit. supra note 3.
Armstrong v. Maryland Coal Co., supra note 3, citing 1 BAraUINER &
ADAILS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 576, 577; see Williams v. Gibson, 84 Ala. 328, 4
29

DoNLEY,op.

So. 350 (1888) cited in Adldns v. United Fuel Gas Co., supra note 3; as
applied to the grant or reservation of a right of way, see Davis v. Jefferson
County Tel. Co., 82 W. Va. 357, 95 S.E. 1042 (1918).
30 Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp. v. Meadows, 184 Va. 168, 34 S.E.2d
392 (1945); Yukon Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Ratliff, 181 Va. 195, 24 S.E.2d 559
(1943), citing Williams v. Gibson, 84 Ala. 328, 4 So. 350 (1888); 58 C.J.S.,
op. cit. supra note 12, § 159, citing the two Virginia cases: "the incidental
rights of the mineral owner are to be gauged by the necessities of the particular case and therefore vary with changed conditions and circumstances ....
21 See DoNLEY,op. cit. supra note 3.
32 Creasey v. Pyramyd Coal Corp., 116 Ind. App. 124, 61 N.E.2d 477
(1945); Trivette v. Consolidation Coal Co., 296 Ky. 529, 177 S.W.2d 868
1944); Flannery v. Utilities Elkhorn Coal Co., 282 Ky. 355, 138 S.W.2d 988
1940); Wells v. North East Coal Co., 255 Ky. 63, 72 S.W.2d 745 (1934).
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